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SOCIAL SECURITY BENEFITS FOR ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN
AFTER LEVY v. LOUISIANA
HERBERT SEWMEL*
T hroughout history, society has regarded the illegitimate child with disdain,
branding him with the "sin" of his adulterous parents as if he had control
over his birth. Inasmuch as the law mirrors the ethics of society, the legal pro-
cess has regarded him similarly. Fortunately time passses and opinions change.
Last year, the Supreme Court of the United States decided two cases in which
the rights of illegitimate children were at issue. Should these decisions be broadly
applied, a further liberalization of the treatment of illegitimate children would
follow. This paper is written to examine the possible impact of these decisions
on the social insurance benefits payable under the Social Security Act since
that Act contains provisions discriminating against illegitimates.
I. THE Levy AND Glona CASES
In Levy v. Louisiana,' five illegitimate children sued for damages because
of the wrongful death of their mother. The Louisiana courts denied recovery,
holding that a child under the Louisiana wrongful death statute meant, a legit-
imate child. For the same reason, in Glona v. American Guaranty & Liability
Insurance Co.,2 a mother was denied recovery by the Louisiana courts for the
wrongful death of her illegitimate son. The Supreme Court of the United States
reversed in both cases, holding that the denial of the right to recover was an
invidious discrimination which violated the equal protection clause of the four-
teenth amendment of the Constitution.
The rather loose opinions of Justice Douglas in Levy and Glona, with an
absurd analogy to incorporated bastards, an incorrect assumption that tortfeasors
would go free because a surviving illegitimate could not recover, and a pull on
the heartstrings, makes analysis of the cases difficult. 3 The essence of the brief
opinion in Levy is "that it is invidious to discriminate against them [illegitimate
children] when no action, conduct or demeanor of theirs is possibly relevant to
the harm that was done the mother."4
It is in the Glona case that the Court emphasizes the broad sweep of its
ruliig. Here the mother is permitted to recover for the loss of her illegitimate
child although the Court must concede that the illegitimate status is caused
by the "action" (or inaction at the 'crucial moment) of the mother. Conceding
* Professor of Law, University of Illinois; B.S. 1950, New York University; LL.B.
1953, Harvard University.
1. Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968).
2. Glona v. American Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 73 (1968).
3. For a detailed analysis of the ramifications of Levy and Glona which are beyond
the scope of this paper, see Krause, Equal Protection for the Illegitimate, 65 MicH. L. Rxv.
477 (1967) and Legitimate and Illegitimate Offspring of Levy v. Louisiana-First Decisions
on Equal Protection and Paternity, 36 U. Cm. L. REv. 338 (1969).
4. 391 U.S. 68, 72 (1968).
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the interest of the state in promoting legitimacy, the Court nevertheless concludes
that
[There is] 34o possible rational basis .. . for assuming that if the
natural mother is allowed recovery for the wrongful death of her ille-
gitimate child, the cause of illegitimacy will be served. It would, in-
deed, be farfetched to assume that women have illegitimate children
so that they can be compensated in damages for their death.5
Framing the issue in this narrow way-would denial of damages for wrongful
death discourage illegitimacy?-prescribes the answer. The Court might have
framed the question in terms of whether it is rational for a state to discourage
illegitimacy by depriving the unwed mother of a variety of benefits which the
mother of a legitimate child receives, including recovery of damages for wrongful
death of a child. Such a classification of mothers may well fall within the area
of legislative judgment to which the Court repeatedly says it gives great latitude.
The failure of the opinion to view the issue in this broader view which might
have led to a different result in Glona leads to the conclusion that the Court
intended to use the "brute force" attributed to it by the dissent so as once and
for all to end all disparate treatment based on the legitimacy or illegitimacy of
a child's birth.
The broad language of Levy might be construed to support the granting of
a benefit to a child by reason of his relationship to either parent. The status of
the child is not a result of his "action, conduct or demeanor"0 whether he is
seeking benefits through his father or mother. Nonetheless, both cases involved
mother and child, not father and child. A disparate legal treatment of the ille-
gitimate in relation to his father may have a rational basis in some context,
and this must be considered in discussing the relevance of Levy and Glona to
the social security laws.
Justice Douglas, in his opinion, stressed the closeness of the mother-child
relationship. Accordingly, a state may seek to justify a classification based on
legitimacy, generalizing that more fathers live with and have a close relation
to their legitimate children than with their illegitimate children. Such a gener-
alization, even if accurate, does not support the rationality of all forms of dis-
parate treatment of illegitimates; rather it offers a means of analysis of each type
of treatment to ascertain whether the difference is rational. The question in
these terms should be whether the particular benefit is based on the closeness of
the father-child relationship or on some other factor. Thus, the obligation of a
father to support his child cannot be related to the closeness of the relationship;
indeed, legal enforcement of the obligation is found mostly in cases where the
father has demonstrated his lack of concern by desertion or nonsupport. Accord-
ingly, a denial of support based on closeness of relationship must be viewed as
irrational, punitive and unconstitutional under Levy.
5. 391 US. at 75.
6. See note 3 supra and accompanying text.
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If a state's purpose were to encourage marriage, it is hardly rational to
suppose that it would not be accomplished by denying benefits to illegitimates
based on their relationship to their fathers. This justification, offered by so
many in opposing welfare benefits, presupposes a most unusual consideration
in the mind of either progenitor at the time of conception. If anything, relieving
a father of any responsibility to an illegitimate may encourage illegitimacy.
A more difficult issue in this type of analysis, and the one most crucial to
the question of social security benefits, is the constitutionality of state intestacy
laws which, with some exceptions, do not permit an illegitimate to inherit from
his father. Intepretation of the words such as "child" or "heir" in wills and
trusts to mean only legitimate children may reasonably be founded on the more
usual closeness of the father-legitimate child relation, since the court is deter-
mining the testator's presumed intent in disposing of his property. However
the same reasoning is inapplicable to intestacy laws. A rigid adherence to the
fiction that the intestacy laws are a substitute will is unduly formalistic and
unrealistic. Certainly many people are unaware of the intestacy laws and few
lawyers would recommend that clients rely on intestacy to express their intent
on distribution of their estates. Intestacy laws reflect the state's judgment as
to whom property should descend when the decedent has not specified its dis-
position. It is clear that the state's classification has no basis in the closeness
of the relationship; estranged wives and rejected legitimate children share equally
with loved ones. If it is argued that the preference for wives and legitimate
children is permissible, since it is based on the normative situation of a closer
relationship than with the illegitimate child, what rational basis is there for
preferring the remote legitimate collateral relative to a man's own child, even
an illegitimate one. The denial of a right to inherit under the intestacy laws is
largely a continuation of an historical primitive attitude toward illegitimates.
A more practical reason for distinguishing between the mother-child and
father-child relationship is the difficulty of proof of paternity. In cases where
benefits are claimed upon the death of the putative father, the most likely situa-
tion in a claim for Social Security benefits, the most reliable proof of non-
paternity, the blood test, will be impossible and the man will not be available to
testify. However, the courts have always felt free to reject the uncontradicted
testimony of the mother, even if internally consistent, if the court regards the
testimony as lacking in credence because of the witness' demeanor or other cir-
cumstances. justice Douglas appears to have rejected any argument based on
difficulties of proof in the majority opinion in Glona.
Opening the courts to suits of this kind may conceivably be a
temptation to some to assert motherhood fraudulently. That problem,
,however, concerns burden of proof. Where the claimant is plainly the
mother, the State denies equal protection of the laws to withhold relief
merely because the child, wrongfully killed, was born to her out of
wedlock.7
7. 391 U.S. at 76.
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In Shapiro v. Thompson,8 the Court similarly refused to accept prevention
of fraud as a constitutionally rational basis for imposing a one-year residency
requirement for public assistance. "[I] t is unreasonable to accomplish this ob-
jective [prevention of fraud by the receipt of welfare payments from two states]
by the blunderbuss method of denying assistance to all indigent newcomers for
an entire year."9
II. RELEVANT DECISIONS IN THE WA=- OF Levy AND Glona
Although the cases decided since Levy and Glona are insufficient in number
to permit a definitive judgment as to what the future holds, the courts, with
the exception of a majority of the Ohio Supreme Court,10 have concurred in
Justice Douglas' sympathy for the illegitimate and have applied Levy and Glona
broadly. In one case, the Missouri Supreme Court" (and the minority in Ohio)
relied on the lack of fault on the part of the illegitimate child and held that
Levy required a reversal of long-standing decisions denying an illegitimate the
right to support from his father. In another,' 2 the New Jersey Supreme Court
held that Levy required that an illegitimate recover for the wrongful death of
his father in the same manner as legitimates. The Court refused to rule on the
constitutionality of the New Jersey intestacy law denying inheritance to ille-
gitimates from their father, although the issue was squarely before it. The New
Jersey wrongful death statute had granted the right to sue to those who inherit
by intestacy, thus excluding the illegitimate plaintiffs in the case. The Court
examined Levy and Glona and concluded, "We find it impossible to tell from
Levy and Glona whether their thesis will embrace the devolution of intestate
property, especially of the putative father."'18 The Court decided to ignore the
issue because the reference to the intestacy law in the wrongful death statute
was "incidental" and
the underlying principle [of Levy] must be that when children suffer
tortious injury by the wrongful death of a parent, their legitimacy is
irrelevant to the tortfeasor's liability, and hence it is invidious to
grant a remedy to the legitimate and withhold it from the illegitimate
child. Under that thesis, it can be of no logical moment whether that
parent was the mother or the father. 14
The Court may be excused for framing the issue in terms of liability, for
Justice Douglas' opinion implies that the issue is whether the tortfeasor will go
8. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
9. Id. at 637.
10. By a 4-3 vote the Ohio Supreme Court refused to give an illegitimate the right
to sue his father for support. The majority rejected a constitutional argument based on
Levy in a brief footnote. "The rights announced in Levy were based on the intimate, familial
relationship which exists between a mother and her child, whether the child is legitimate or
illegitimate." Baston v. Sears, 15 Ohio St. 2d 166, 168, 239 N.E.2d 62, 63 (1968).
11. R. v. R., 431 S.W.2d 152 (Mo. 1968).
12. Schmoll v. Creecy, 54 N.J. 194, 254 A.2d 525 (1969).
-13. Id. at 196, 254 A.2d at 528.
14. Id. at 197, 254 A.2d at 529.
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free or be required to pay." The analysis is nonetheless faulty. The issue may
not be the liability of the tortfeasor at all but rather to whom the proceeds of
any recovery will be distributed,16 and that question is essentially the same if
the property to be distributed comes from the tort recovery or assets accumu-
lated by the deceased during his lifetime. In New Jersey the statute confirms
this identity by incorporating the intestacy law into the wrongful death statute.
Thus the decision in New Jersey must logically be applicable to inheritance on
intestacy.
The North Dakota Supreme Court has also given direct support to the
right of illegitimates to inherit by intestacy and indirect support to such in-
heritance from the father. The North Dakota intestacy law permitted an ille-
gitimate to inherit from his mother but not from or through his legitimate
half-brother on his mother's side, a result which was declared unconstitutional
under Levy.17 Significantly, the Court gave no consideration to the "closeness
of relationship" test but founded its decision entirely on the "no fault" concept
applicable to both the mother and father relationship. "This statute, which
punishes innocent children for their parents' transgressions, has no place in our
system of government, which has as one of its basic tenets equal protection for
all."18
Perhaps the most significant application of Levy for Social Security pur-
poses can be found in the Fifth Circuit's decision in Hebert v. Petroleum Pipe
Inspectors Corp.,'9 for it is the federal courts which will determine the effect
of Levy on Social Security benefits. The district court had dismissed a wrong-
ful death action brought under the Jones Act on behalf of illegitimate children
of the deceased seaman on the ground that they were not "children" within the
meaning of the Act "because they were the adulterously illegitimate offspring
of the deceased father so denominated by Louisiana law." The Fifth Circuit
reversed per curiam, citing only Levy. The significance lies in the fact that the
reference to Levy (and hence the constitutional issue) was unnecessary since
the Fifth Circuit and the other handful of cases in point had all agreed that
illegitimates could recover under the Jones Act as a matter of statutory inter-
pretation.20
III. SOCIAL SECURITY BENEFITS
The social insurance provisions (old age, survivor's and disability insurance
and dependent's benefits) of the Social Security Act treat illegitimate children
15. 391 U.S. at 71.
16. In Schmoll v. Creecy, 54 NJ. 194, 254 A.2d 525 (1969), the deceased left two
legitimate children as well as five illegitimate children.
17. In re Estate of Jensen, 162 N.W.2d 861 (N.D. 1968).
18. Id. at 878.
19. Hebert v. Petroleum Pipe Inspectors, Inc., 396 F.2d 237 (5th Cir. 1968).
20. See, Hassan v. A. M. Landry & Son, Inc., 321 F.2d 570 (5th Cir. 1963), cert. den.,
375 U.S. 967; Civil v. Waterman Steamship Corp., 217 F.2d 94 (2d Cir. 1954); Doyle v.
Albatross Tanker Corp., 260 F. Supp. 303 (S.D.N.Y. 1965), aff'd 367 F.2d 465 (2d Cir.
1966); Note, The Rights of Illegitimates Under Federal Statutes, 76 HAv. L. Rav. 337,
346-53 (1962).
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differently and less advantageously than legitimate children in three major re-
spects. Section 216(h) (2) (A), 21' makes eligibility for children's benefits de-
pend on the definition of child in the state intestacy laws, most of which do
not grant illegitimates the right to inherit from their father.22 Second, section
202(d) (3)23 removes the requirement of dependency of a child on his parent
as a condition for benefits for all legitimate children, but not for all illegitimate
children. Third, under section 203(a)(3)24 when total benefits payable on the
account of an insured exceed the statutory maximum, all benefits payable to
illegitimate children, under the special provisions making certain illegitimates
eligible, are reduced first without reduction for any other beneficiary of the
same insured. A reduction affecting any recipient other than an illegitimate
child is, in contrast, made pro rata for all recipients from the account of the
same insured. In addition under section 202(g)( 1)25 mothers of illegitimate
children are denied mothers' benefits because they have never been married
to the father of the child while mothers of legitimate children will receive such
benefits if they were married to the deceased insured at the time time of his
death or met the special tests for surviving divorced mothers. Whether any of
these distinctions could be considered rational after Levy and Glona remains
to be considered.
A. Social Security Benefits-The Father-Child Relationship
Children's benefits under the Social Security Act may be payable if a
parent qualifies for a retirement or disability pension or if a parent dies while
fully or currently insured.28 At present, when illegitimate children do not qualify
for Social Security benefits it is usually because their claim is based on the
eligibility and earnings of their father. As will be seen, most illegitimates can
qualify for children's benefits based on their mother's account. However, a
mother may have insufficient quarters of covered earnings to qualify either her-
self or the child for benefits or she may have a lower earning base than the
father, resulting in less benefit for the child than he could have obtained were
he entitled to benefits based on his father's earnings. In many cases, the father
dies, becomes disabled or retires before the mother's status entitles the child
to benefits. Thus the illegitimate child may receive no benefits in the event he
cannot qualify on his father's account.
Whether Levy changes the existing situation will depend on whether the
Levy rationale applies to the father-child relationship. For the reasons explained
above, the remainder of this paper assumes that Levy, in at least some respect,
is applicable.
21. 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(2) (A) (1964).
22. H. CLARx, LAw oF DouESTic RELATONS § 5.4 (1968).
23. 42 U.S.C. § 402(d)(3) (1964).
24. 42 U.S.C. § 403(a)(3) (1964).
25. 42 U.S.C. § 402(g)(1) (1964).
26. Section 202(d)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 402(d)(1) (1964).
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1. The Definition of "Child"
The basic definition of "child" has not been materially changed since the
Social Security Act was amended in 1939 to provide children's benefits. Under
current-law "the term 'child' means (1) the child or legally adopted child of
an individual" with numerous special provisions expanding the definition.27
"Child," of course, could be construed in accordance with common usage to
mean any natural child of a man. But the Act has always contained a provision
which has been uniformly applied to deny benefits to illegitimates who do not
inherit under any state law, except for those who now qualify under the special
provisions of sections 216(h) (2) (B) or (h) (3).28 Section 216(h) (2) (A) 29
provides:
In determining whether an applicant is the child or parent of a
fully or currently insured individual for purposes of this subchapter,
the Secretary shall apply such law as would be applied in determining
whether the devolution of intestate personal property by the courts of
the State in which such insured individual is domiciled.... Applicants
who according to such law would have the same status relative to
taking intestate personal property as a child or parent shall be deemed
such.
Since illegitimates rarely inherit by intestacy from their fathers, this section has
uniformly been applied to exclude illegitimates from the definition of "child"
of their father.3 ) The result was that prior to the 1965 amendments, few ille-
gitimates could recover benefits based on their father's earnings.
The 1965 amendments3' opened the way for a large group of illegitimate
children to receive benefits where paternity had been established by a written
acknowledgement by the father or a court determination, or by a judicial sup-
port order based on paternity.3 2 Such acknowledgement or decree must occur
before the death or disability of the father or, in the case of benefits on retire-
ment, one year before he became entitled to old-age benefits or reached age 65,
whichever is earlier. Illegitimates, thus recognized, can receive benefits even
though the father is neither living with nor supporting the child. In addition,
if the insured is shown by evidence satisfactory to the Social Security Adminis-
tration to be the father of the applicant and was living with or contributing
to the support of the child at the required time, the illegitimate is deemed to
be the child of his father for purposes of the statute even without an acknowl-
edgement or court decree. Section 216(h) (2) (B) also grants status as a "child"
to one who is illegitimate solely because a legal impediment prevented the
validity of a good faith marriage ceremony between his mother and father.
27. Section 216(e), 42 U.S.C. § 416(e) (1964).
28. 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(2)(B) (1964) and (h)(3) (Supp. 1969).
29. 42 U.S.C. § 416(h) (2) (A) (1964).
30. E.g., Warrenberger v. Folsom, 239 F.2d 846 (3d Cir. 1956); Rivera v. Celebrezze,
248 F. Supp. 807 (D.P.R. 1966).
31. 79 Stat. 409 (1965).
32. Section 216(h)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(3) (Supp. 1969).
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As a result, the only illegitimates who now are not deemed to be "children"
under the Act (assuming paternity could be established satisfactorily) are
those whose father has neither acknowledged them in writing nor been judicially
declared to be their father, and who is neither living with nor contributing to
the child's support. Although no figures are available to measure the number in
this excluded group, it is likely to be substantial. Moreover, it is this group of
deserted children who are most likely to be receiving public assistance, generally
in the form of Aid To Families with Dependent Children. The denial of Social
Security benefits submits them to the indignities of the public assistance system
and, at the same time, shifts approximately half the cost of their support from
the federal government to the states.
Levy may very well result in the inclusion of this group under the definition
of "child." If Levy is held to bar any distinction between legitimates and ille-
gitimates in inheriting from the father under intestacy laws, then illegitimates
can meet the statutory definition of child in section 216(h) (2) (A) and will
avoid any disparate treatment. If Levy does not require any change in the intes-
tacy laws, then the illegitimate's status under the Social Security Act is not
improved.
Professor Krause has suggested a possible middle ground which in turn
raises a question of interpretation of the Social Security Act.33 Applying "close-
ness of relationship" analysis, Levy may permit a state to allow legitimates to
take by intestacy ahead of illegitimates but prohibit favoring a more remote
legitimate relative over an illegitimate child. In such event, is an illegitimate child
one who under the state intestacy law "would have the same status relative to
taking intestate personal property as a child"? 34 This question should be an-
swered affirmatively. A state adopting the suggested priorities on intestacy would
in effect be creating a class of "children" for intestacy purposes and then creat-
ing priorities within the class. The illegitimate would derive his right to inherit
based on his status as a "child" of the deceased, the statutory test under the
definition provided in section 216(h) (2) (A).
There should be no need to await individual state court decisions on the
intestacy issue for illegitimates to receive Social Security benefits. Even though
the applicable state court may not yet have ruled as to the effect of Levy, the
state courts are bound by the supremacy clause and therefore the state intestacy
law as modified by Levy is the "law as would be applied in determining the
devolution of intestate personal property by the courts of the State" under sec-
tion 216(h) (2) (A). Indeed, even a rejection by a state court of the application
of Levy to fathers or to intestacy should not be decisive. It is the responsibility
of the federal agencies and the federal courts where Social Security litigation
takes place to determine whether state interpretation of the United States Con-
33. Krause, Legitimate and Illegitimate Offspring of Levy v. Louisiana-First Decisions
in Equal Protection and Paternity, 36 U. Cxi. L. Rnv. 338, 354 (1969).
34. Section 216(h)(2)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(2)(A) (1964).
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stitution is correct. Federal benefits should not and may not be denied by incor-
poration of an unconstitutional state law into federal statute. In Shapiro v.
Thompson, the Court said that "Congress may not authorize the States to vio-
late the Equal Protection Clause.... Congress is without power to enlist state
cooperation in a joint federal-state program by legislation which authorizes the
States to violate the Equal Protection Clause."3 5
2. Dependency Test
Children's benefits under the Social Security Act have always been condi-
tioned in theory upon the child's dependency on his parent. In fact, however
(with minor exceptions inapplicable here), legitimate children have always been
eligible for benefits even though they neither reside with nor receive support
from their father. Section 202(d) provides that a legitimate child is deemed
dependent upon his father unless he has been adopted by some other individual.3 6
When the special provisions of sections 216(h) (2) (B) and (h) (3) were added
to include certain illegitimates within the scope of the definition of "child,"
section 202 (d) was also modified to read
For the purposes of this paragraph, a child deemed to be a child
of a fully or currently insured individual pursuant to section 216
(h) (2) (B) or section 216(h) (3) shall be deemed to be the legitimate
child of such individual.37
The result of the incredibly tortured language of 202 (d) is that all children are
eligible for benefits regardless of whether they are living with or supported by
their father, except illegitimate children whose paternity has not been acknowl-
edged in writing by the father or judicially decreed. If after Levy, such ille-
gitimates fall within the definition of "child," may they still be denied benefits
because of non-dependency when others receive them without regard to depen-
dency? It is difficult to find a rational basis for such a distinction other than the
administrative difficulties of ascertaining paternity, a reason which apparently
lacks constitutional weight. A father is legally obligated to support his children,
legitimate and illegitimate alike, in almost every state, and Levy may well re-
quire equal treatment of legitimates and illegitimates in child support.38 It
hardly seems rational to deny benefits only to that group of deserted illegitimate
children who have been unfortunate enough not to have some public authority
or adult pursue his father and obtain a judicial decree or written acknowledge-
ment of paternity. "[I] t is invidious to discriminate against them when no ac-
tion, conduct, or demeanor of theirs is possibly relevant"3 9 to the nature of the
benefit or the basis of the classification.
35. 394 U.S. 618, 641 (1969).
36. 42 U.S.C. § 402 (d)(3) (Supp. 1969).
37. Id.
38. See Krause, supra note 33 at 353.
39. Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 72 (1968).
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3. Maximum Benefit Limitations
Benefits under the Social Security Act are generally based on the earnings
of the insured individual either since 1950 or reaching age 21, whichever is later,
excluding the five lowest earning years in that period. From the average monthly
wage, the primary insurance amount is determined from a schedule in section
215(a). The primary insurance amount is the monthly payment the insured in-
dividual would receive upon retirement at 65. Both children's benefits and moth-
er's benefits are paid at three-fourths of the primary insurance benefit of the
insured individual. Thus, an insured worker who died in 1969 with average
earnings for benefit purposes of $300 per month would have a primary insurance
amount of $127.10. If he left a wife and two children, each would be eligible
for a benefit of $95.40 (Y4 of $127.10) or a total of $286.20. They would not
actually receive that much because section 203 (a) imposes maximum limits on
the benefits payable on the account of one insured individual.40 In the case of
the worker above, the maximum limit is $240 per month; under section 203 (a),
the mother's and children's benefits would be reduced pro rata, so that each
would receive $80 a month.
Reductions due to the maximum-benefit-limit are always pro rata among
those claiming benefits based on the earnings of another, except when the claim-
ant is an illegitimate child. Section 203 (a) (3) provides that in the event the
maximum benefit provisions come into effect, the reduction shall first be applied
solely to those to whom benefits are payable solely by reason of the special pro-
visions for illegitimate children in section 216(h) (3). Thus, if our worker left
an illegitimate child eligible under 216(h) (3), in addition to his wife and two
legitimate children, the illegitimate child would receive no benefits because of
section 203 (a) (3). This provision seems clearly unconstitutional if Levy has
any relation to the father-child relationship. As noted above, the one area where
the law has given relative equality to illegitimates is in their right to support
from their father, and given Levy, it is difficult to offer a rational legislative pur-
pose for depriving illegitimates of all their benefits while granting benefits to
legitimate children. The purpose of children's benefits is to provide a substitute
for the loss of support which results from the death, retirement, or disability
of the parent. The constitutional issue can be avoided if Levy is read as amend-
ing state intestacy laws so that illegitimates can inherit from their father. In
that event, illegitimates will be freed from the discriminatory provisions of 203
(a) (3) since they will qualify not "soley by reason of section 216(h) (3)" but
also because they would be children within the definition of section 216(h) (2)
(A). Thus, where maximum limits come into play, those illegitimates already
eligible under 216(h) (3) would also benefit from Levy.41
40. 42 U.S.C. § 403(a) (Supp. 1969).
41. It is conceivable that all the maximum benefit limitations in Social Security may
be successfully attacked on constitutional grounds along the lines of recent cases declaring
family limits on public assistance payments violative of equal protection. See, e.g., Williams
v. Dandridge, 297 F. Supp. 450 (D.C. Md. 1968). Although there are significant differences
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B. Social Security Benefits-The Mother-Child Relationship
If Levy is applicable only to the mother-child relation it will have little
impact on children's benefits under social security. In most states illegitimate
children now inherit from their mothers under intestacy laws,42 therefore they
will be deemed a "child" under section 216(h) (2) (A) in the same manner as
a legitimate child. Since they qualify for benefits without reference to the special
provision for illegitimates in section 216(h)(3), they are not subject to any
discrimination under 203 (a) (3) in the event of benefit reductions where the
statutory maximums are exceeded. Technically, section 203(d) (3) would con-
tinue to treat some illegitimate children differently in case of the dependency
test. That section expressly provides that a legitimate child is deemed to be
dependent on his insured parent whether or not he is in fact so dependent,
whereas an illegitimate child is not deemed dependent unless his insured parent
was either living with or contributing to the support of the child. However, the
Social Security Administration has removed this disparity in its regulations in
the case of a child claiming benefits on his mother's earnings by providing that
the child is deemed to be dependent on his mother if she is his natural mother.4 3
In other words, illegitimates are treated the same as legitimates for purposes of
waiving the dependency requirement in case of benefits claimed on the mother's
earnings. There does not appear to be any statutory basis for this special treat-
ment in the mother's case as section 202(d) (3) specifically refers to both the
"father or adopting father or his mother or adopting mother." Nevertheless, it
meets the constitutional requirement imposed by Levy. If an illegitimate cannot
be denied recovery of tort damages for the wrongful death of his mother, it
follows that he also cannot be denied social insurance benefits payable on the
death, retirement or disability of his mother when a legitimate child can recover
in the same circumstances. Both insurance benefits and tort recovery are pro-
vided to compensate, among other things, for the loss of support from the
parent. No more rational basis exists for denying insurance benefits than for
denying tort recovery.
The impact of Levy on benefits on the mother's earnings will apply only
in those few states which do not permit illegitimates to inherit from their moth-
ers by intestacy. Levy app'ears to require the end to such discrimination.44 After
Levy, all state intestacy laws should be read as including illegitimate children
of the mother within the term "child," and thus the illegitimate will meet the
definition of "child" in section 216(h) (2) of the Social Security Act. Thus
they will be eligible for children's benefits based on the mother's earnings.
in the bases for payments of social insurance as contrasted with public assistance (see Shapiro
v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 at 633 n.10 (1969)) the constitutional argument should be as-
serted in Social Security claims and litigation.
42. H. CrLAm, LAW op Dommsmc RELATIONs § 5.4 (1968).
43. 20 C.F.R. § 404,327 (1967).
44. In re Estate of Jensen, 162 N.W.2d 861 (ND. 1968).
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C. Social Security Mother's Benefits
When an insured individual dies, his widow (and in some cases a surviving
divorced wife) may be eligible for a mother's benefit if she has in her care a
child of the deceased eligible for children's benefits. 46 The mother of an illegit-
imate child usually cannot obtain similar benefits since she was never married
to the deceased. 46 Levy and Glona might require an end to this disparate treat-
ment of mothers of illegitimates; it might be argued that mother's benefits are
in fact intended as a benefit to the child. In Newsom v. Social Security Board,
the court said that the purpose of mother's benefits was "to extend financial
protection to the widow, regardless of her age, while she has in her care a
child of the deceased husband entitled to child's insurance benefits, to supple-
ment the orphan's benefits and, either to enable the widow to remain at home
and care for the child, or, at least to assume parental responsibility for the
welfare and care of the child if she did not live in the same home with the
child." 47 Congressional intent that the mother's.benefit is for the child's interests
may be evidenced by the fact that widows are provided a separate benefit upon
reaching age 60.48 If Levy is read broadly to mean that illegitimate and legit-
imate children must be treated alike in terms of benefits accruing from the
father-child relationship, it could be argued that the Constitution requires that
the illegitimate be given that same opportunity for additional care and support
from his mother as is afforded legitimate children through the benefit payable
to their mother. Approached from the perspective of the mother of an illegit-
imate, Glona can be read to assert that a mother cannot be denied a benefit
based on a relationship to her illegitimate child which is afforded mothers of
legitimates. "To say that the test of equal protection should be the 'legal'
rather than the biological relationship is to avoid the issue. For the Equal Pro-
tection Clause necessarily limits the authority of a State to draw such 'legal'
lines as it chooses."149 The class of persons receiving benefits are mothers of the
deceased children and Congress may not constitutionally discriminate within
such a class solely on the basis of whether the mother ever entered into a for-
mal marriage with the father.
-In support of constitutionality, it might be asserted that mother's benefits
may be viewed as being payable because of the personal relationship between
the mother and father (the insured individual) rather than the mother-child or
father-child relationship. It would be reasonable for Congress to grant benefits
to persons who have been married to an insured individual and deny it to others
who may have had as close, if not closer, relationship to the insured than his
wife. Certainly the provision for wife's benefits provides no constitutional corn-
45. Section 202(g), 42 U.S.C. § 402(g) (1964).
46. See § 216(h)(1)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(1)(B) (1964), as to the case of an invalid
marriage entered into in good faith.
47. 70 F. Supp. 962, 964 (ED. Mich. 1947).
48. Section 202(e), 42 U.S.C. § 402(e) (Supp. 1969).
49. Glona v. American Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 73, 75-76 (1968).
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pulsion to provide similarly for mistresses. According to this view, the statutory
scheme provides benefits to wives upon reaching age 60 or earlier in certain
cases, including the case where the recipient cares for a child of a deceased in-
sured. But such a view of the statutory scheme is inaccurate; widows under 60
do not receive benefits (unless disabled) because of their marital status, and the
mother's benefit terminates if a child of the insured is no longer in her care or
reaches eighteen. The conclusion is that the mother's benefit is payable solely
because of the mother-child relation, not the wife-husband relation, and there-
fore no distinction is valid based on the legitimacy of the child.

